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IN THE SUPREI!E COURT
STATE OF UTAH
HARLOW VINCENT and
Mi\xtW~ VE:CENT, his vJife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No. 15311

VS.

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendant and Appellant.

-----------------------------------------RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action for the undermining of the plaintiffs'
garage and settling

caused by a Salt Lake County storm drain.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs
in the amount of $15,645.00 which was later amended by the court
to the amount of $17,583.47.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek affirmation of the judgment and
the judgment in its favor.
STATE~ffiNT

OF FACTS

Harlmv Vincent purchased in 1957 Lot 38, Olympus Heights
Subdivision.

This lot is kno\vn as 4222 Coral Street in Salt Lake

County, (about 4200 South and 2600 East in Holladay, Utah) (R 68).
He commenced construction of a home for his wife and six children
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the fall and winter of 1959 and 1960.

(R

69)

The home faces

east and the garage is on the south side of the lot.

The creation

of the subdivision of East Olympus Hei~hts, approved by Salt lake
County, did not create or reserve an easement for a storm drain.
(Ex. l, R 6)

In 1958 with tDe creation of the streets in Olympus

Cove, which is a large subdivision to the east of the plaintiffs'
property, and the surface water created from the street and the
inability of existing channels to contain the water,

(R 40) Salt

Lake County installed a storm drain from Olympus Cove west through
the property later purchased by the plaintiffs and installed a
pipe of about 24 to 30 inches in diameter without any right or
easement of record that can be found.

On some of the land out-

side of the subdivision, they did get easeoents (Ex. 5).

The

storm drain pipe is relatively dry and without water most of the
time and is Deriodic in nature and usually only contains water when
there is a rain storm or inclement weather in Olympus Cove and the
Holladay area.
Harlow Vincent, on the purchase of his lot, knew that
there was a storm drain by virtue of a collection grate on the
side of his lot.

(R 69).

soo~

I
I

He thought it was along the property

line bet\veen himself and his neighbor to the south.

The storm

drain line was not discovered or uncovered at any time during the ,
course of the construction of his home.

(R 61)

His garage is

10 feet from the property line.

I
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I

L

In the first ten years no problem occurred, but after
installin~

some cabinets in the garage in the fall of 1970, (R 71)

and in the

snrin~

dryin~

of 1971 he noticed some

~airline

cracks like putty

out around the windows and doors in the garage and wondered

if the weigbt of the cabinets had caused it.

(R 71)

1972
In the sprinp, of 1972, there was more cracking, but
not serious, maybe an eighth of an inch over the doon.;rays in the
garage.

(R 85)

He then wondered if the storm drain might be

clor,ged so he called Salt Lake County Flood Control and asked them
to inspect it.

They didn't call him or return his call, so he

then called them again and they said "they had made an inspection
and they had found no coincidence between that and the storm drain".
(R 72)

1973
In the spring of 1973, the cracks were greater to the
extent of one fourth to three eighths of an inch.

He called Salt

Lake County Flood Control again and again they did not call back,
but upon Hr. Vincent calling the!!!, they assured him "they could
see no correlation between l!ly problem and the storm drain".
(R 73)

1974
In the last of May, 1974, he noticed additional slippage
and talked to Ken Watson (R 73), Engineering Coordinator for Salt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lake County Flood Control (R 22) and they again gave him "no
satisfaction".

(R 73)

Up until June, 1974, there had only

been cracks around the doors and windows of the garage and Lynn
Jones, Contractor, thought that it was an inadequate footing that
was causing the problem, when he saw it in the fall of 1973, and
said that it could have been repaired for less than $500.00 at
(R 123).

that time.

Then during the months of June, July and August.

1974, the brick wall of the garage bowed, the beams began to twist,
the roof sagged, mortar cracked out of the joints in the brick in
the garage.

He then hired Lynn Jones and excavated along the garage

wall and observed the water coming in from the unsealed joints of
the storm drain.

(R 74)

Then after discovery of the condition

in July, 1974, he sent notice on August 30, 1974, to Salt Lake Coun:y
(E~.

42)

All of the bowing of the brick walls, the roof sagging,

the mortar cracking in the joints and the twisting of the beams
and all but $500.00 damage was done during the three month period
prior to August 30, 1974.

William Kaysworm, Superintendent of Salt

Lake County Flood Control, during the period from 1961 to 1972,
stated that Salt Lake County had been given notice of the problem
at the Vincent home during the period of time that he was employed,

1

and that he personally, and the Flood Control Commissioner in 1972 I
. I
(R 101) . He thereafter sent a cre1:
went to the Vincent residence.
1

out and grouted the joints. (R 101).

Upon being asked what he toU1

Vincent, he said "Well, we just told him that we didn't think that I
I
I
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it was our problem"

*

1'

,.,

(R 103).

He then said that the storm

drain should not have been placed through the lot of the Vincent
home (R 102) and that it had been poorly engineered.

That from

the time he had been employed by Salt Lake County from 1961 to
1972, he never installed pipe without sealing the joints. (R 99)
(R 107).

He also stated that grouting joints with concrete is

not satisfactory and they will not as a rule hold. (R 99)

That

for years Salt Lake County has required rubber gaskets for installation
of concrete storm pipes.

(Ex. 2)

Blaine W. Dalton, Pipe Contrac-

tor, with vast experience in the area since the 1920s stated
that the standards for concrete pipe installation for 40 years
have been the same, to install water-tight joints. (R 145)

He

further testified the pipe installed down the side of the Vincent
horne was poorly laid, not in line, (R 141) not sealed, and was
leaking water, (R 1l12) even water was flowing under the pipe,
(R 142) and that the pipe was filling with sand and dirt from the
outside of the pipe.

(R 144)

Mr. Dalton said that the line would

either have to be removed and replaced with proper rubber gasket
pipe or would always continue to leak.

He then explained how the

problem had occurred in the Vincent horne, in that the water over
a long period of time, infiltrates in and out of the pipe carrying
the soil outside of the pipe back in to the pipe as the water
flow goes up and dm-m within the line like a syphon. (R 146)
In September, 1974, Basil McGlochlin, Director of
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Highways and Flood Control of Salt Lake County (Rll3), requested
David Lovell, Engineer, to make a determination of the problem
at the Vincent home.

On September 10, 1974, his letter is as

follows:
"Dear Mr. McGlochlin:
In response to your request concerning the foundation
settlement of the residence owned by Mr. Harlow
Vincent at 4220 Coral Street, we have made an on
site investigation and it is our opinion that the
settlement is a direct result of the leaking storm
drain adjacent to the footings.
If we can provide additional assistance on the project, please contact us.
Very truly yours,
Dale R. Holt
County Surveyor
DRH/DRL/js"
A copy of the letter is attached to this Brief.

The initials

DRH/DRL in signing the letter stand for David R. Lovell.
Don Glaittli stated that the same problem had occurred
on his property one block to the west (R 54).

Salt Lake County,

at the time of the trial, denied that it was their storm drain
until after the testimony of Rowland Smart, (R 39 ), Verion Smart
(R 58 ) , Boyd C. Bott, (R

20 ) , and Don E. Glaittli

(R 31 ) .

They then stipulated that Salt Lake County had installed the
said storm drain (R 61).
Lynn Jones stated that prior to the time of the bowing
of the w·alls, that the home could have been repaired and that the
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I

building would not have incurred additional damage if the water
matter had been taken care of prior to the twisting of the beams,
and the sagging of the roof which occurred in the months of June,
July and August.

The jury then found that it would take $15,093.17

to correct the problems created by the leaking storm drain.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CLAIH IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§63-30-13, (1967).
'
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-13 provides:
A claim against a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is
filed within ninety days after the cause of
action arises;
The question of whether this action is barred by Utah
Code Annotated, §63-30-13, (1967), was ruled on by four judges of
the District Court on successive motions for summary judgment
and during the course of trial:

Judge James Sawaya ruled on it,

(R 139); Judge Dean Conder ruled on it, (R 206); Judge Bryant
H. Croft again had the problem during the settlement conference
and Judge G. Hal Taylor had it during the course of the trial,
(R 375).

It

~vas

their opinion that since Salt Lake County had

installed the storm drain, and that it was buried four or five feet
in the ground, and there was no showing where Salt Lake County
had an easement for its location so that it might be determined
where it was, no question that it had not been discovered by the
I
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plaintiff during the course of any construction during the
building of his home, that the cause of action did not arise
un~il

discovery by the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Christiansen

v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435, stated as follows:
''(1) Therefore, we now hold that, regardless
of prior pronouncements, where a foreign object
is negligently left in the body of a patient
during an operation and the patient is ignorant
of the fact, and consequently of his right of
action for malpractice, the cause of action does
not accrue until the patient learned of the
presence of such foreign object in his body .
It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured
person must cormnence a malpractice action prior
to the time he knew, or reasonably should have
known, of his injury and right of action. It
seems apparent that adherence to the 'majority
rule' would penalize the conscientious doctor,
who would advise his patient of a mistake, and
protect a practitioner, who would not reveal
his mistake until the statute of limitations
became a shield."
Under the facts of this case, William Kaysworm, Flood Superintendent
for Salt Lake County from the period of 1961 to 1972, stated that
the rules and regulations required that all concrete storm drains
have sealed joints.

He further stated that the pipe in question

was not sealed and was defective and he kne\v that the grout that
he used at that time would not hold even though he sent men out
on a fruitless mission to correct the problem. (R 101)
If the discovery rule in this case is not applied and t:,

1

I

rationale of the Christiansen v. Rees case is not followed,

would~l

not be true that there would be one standard of care for doctors ~1
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professional people and still another standard of care for public
servants and their actions.

This would mean that municipal bodies

and public servants would incur no liabilities for their actions
bec.ause the statute of limitations would commence to run regardless of their mistakes, representations.

They could mislead home

owners, such as Mr. Vincent, with impunity.

Again, would not

the rationale of the Christiansen v. Rees case, supra, in fact
penalize the conscientious public servant who would advised the
home owner of a mistake or problem on the installation of a
storm sewer that perhaps could be leaking water under his
foundation and shield those public servants who would not reveal
their negligence until after the statute of limitations had become a shield.
As the case of Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, Colo.l944,
and the Supreme Court of Colorado so aptly stated:

I

:1
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POINT II
THE ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§63-30-13, (1967) ON THE GROUNDS OF CONCEAU!ENT OF THE CAUSE
OF ACTION AND FRAUD BY THE DEFENDANT.
In this case, Mr. Vincent noticed hairline cracks
in 1972, and was assured by the public servants of Salt Lake
County including the Flood Control Director for Salt Lake County,
that it was not their problem and that it was no coincidence
or correlation between the storm drain and his problem.
(R 73) (R 101)

(R 72)

Hilliam Kaysworm also said that the installation

was improper and that it would not hold and there was no dispute
as to these facts and he freely admitted them.

(R 99, 107, 103)

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, §147, states
as the applicable law on the subject as follows:
"The general rule supported by the decisions in
most jurisdictions is that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action from the one to whom it
belongs, by the one against whom it lies, constitutes an implied exception to the statute of
limitations, postponing the commencement of the
running of the statute until discovery or reasonable opportunity of discovery of the fact by the
owner of the cause of action; under this rule, one
who '"rongfully conceals material facts and thereby
prevents discovery of his wrong or the fact that a
cause of action was accrued against him is not
permitted to assert the state of limitations as a
bar to an action against him, thus taking advantage
of his own wrong, until the expiration of the full
statutory period from the time when the facts were
discovered or should with reasonable diligence have'
been discovered . . "
"The reasoning adopted in support of the general
rule is that to hold that the statute of limitations

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

ran in favor of a person who had concealed the
cause of action under such circumstances would be
to pennit the defendant to take advantage of his
own wrong and to sustain a defense of which in good
conscience he ought not to be permitted to avail
himself. Since the delay of bringing the suit is
due to the fraud of the defendant, the cause of
action against him ought not to be considered as
having accrued until the plaintiff could obtain
the knowledge that he had a cause of action. It
would be not onlv subervise of good morals but-contrary to the plainest principles of justice
to permit one practicing a fraud and then concealing
it to plead the statute of limitations when, in fact,
the injured party did not know of and could not with
reasonable eiligence have discovered the fraud.
Our supreme court by previous announcement has also stated that
even regardless of intentional fraud or concealment in the case
of Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy et al., 73 P.2d 1277, at
page 1300 as follows:
"There seems to be no doubt that if this were an
action of fraud, the statute would not begin to
run until the fraud was discovered or reasonably
could have been discovered. But even ~vhen the action
is not based on fraud, in equity where the cause of
action is concealed from the one in whom it resides
~y the one a ainst whom it lies, the statute will
~tponed.
In 37 C.J. 73 it is said that by the
weight of authority the same rule applies in a case
at law."
POINT III
THIS CLAIH IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
§63-30-13, (1967) ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE DEFENDANT, BY ITS CONDUCT,
IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIH THE BENEFIT OF THE STATUTE AND ALSO WAIVED
THE SAME.
Without repeating the facts as set forth in Point I and
Point II, whether there was fraud and concealment and whether the
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discovery rule applies, there was certainly waiver and estoppel
against Salt Lake County as a matter of law.

The Supreme Court

of Utah pronounced itself in the case of Rice v. Granite School
District, 23 Utah 2d, 22, 455 P.2d 159, where the supreme court
says that a government entity is held to the same standard as
a private individual:
"In Benner v. Industrial Ace. Comm., supra, 26 Cal.2d
349, 159, P. 2d 24, 26, the court said: lfuere, as
here, the delay in commencing action was induced by
the conduct of the party sought to be charged the
latter may not invoke such conduct to defeat recovery.
An estoppel may arise although there was no designed
fraud on the part of the person sought to be estopped.
To create an equitable estoppel, it is enough if the
party has been induced to refrain from using such
means or taking such action as lay in his power,
by which he might have retrieved his position and
saved himself from loss .
It is well settled
that a person by his conduct may be estopped
to rely upon these defenses. Where the delay in
commencing action is induced by the conduct of the
defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense
(emphasis added)
The court went on to say:
"Where the delay in commencing an action is induced
by the conduct of the defendant, or his privies, or
an insurance adjuster acting in his behalf, it
cannot be availed of by any of them as a defense.
One cannot justly or equity lull an adversary into
a false sense of security thereby subjecting his
claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to
plead that very delay as a defense to the action when
brought. Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce
a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his
claim '\vill be made may create an estoppel against
pleading the Statute of Limitations."
Under this point, there can be no question that as a matter of lm,
Salt Lake County, by and through its servants. mislead this
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plaintiff in reference to his cause of action and their responsibility
for damages.

If there was a dispute that Bill Kaysworm and the

others had not stated what he indicated to the plaintiff, then there
might be a question of fact under this point, but there is no
question that Bill Kaysworm told this plaintiff in reference to
the problem that was occurring, and as to waylay him and mislead
him \vhen he ·was attempting to find out what the problem was.
POINT IV
THIS ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
§63-30-13, (1967),
Utah Code Annotated, §63-30-13, (1967) provides:
A claim against a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed
within ninety days after the cause of action arises;
Even admitting that the statute of limitations applies,
even admitting that there was no fraud or concealment, even
admitting that there was no estoppel or waiver, the plaintiff
still could recover those damages which occurred within the 90
day period from the time that he filed his claim on August 30, 1974.
(Ex. 42)

From the testimony of Mr. Vincent, there was only
cracking around the doors and windows prior to June, 1974, and
that the bmving of the vJalls, the roof sagging, the mortar cracking
in the joints and the twisting of the beams all occurred after
June, 1974.

The plaintiff certainly could not have commenced
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an action for those damages prior to that period of time because
they had not occurred.

Lynn Jones testified that those damages

as he saw them were only $500.00.

(R 123)

He further testified

in his opinion that if the condition had been corrected, then
nothing further would have occurred.
The case cited by the defendant, Power Farms, Inc. v.
Consolidated Irr. Dist., 119 P.2d 717 (Cal. 1941), has really
no application in that that case all of the damages were incurred
at the one time.

This case is more nearly applicable as to the

statute of limitations problems in reference to nuisances.

Blaine

Dalton and all of the experts agree that the conditions of the
water is such that it runs down the storm drain only at certain
times of the year when there is rain or inclement weather in the
Holladay area.

All of the authorities agree that the pipe can

be corrected by constantly grouting the pipe or installing new
pipe with rubber gaskets.

Therefore, the condition or the nuisanci

as to the leaking pipe is temporary and is not permanent.

The

authorities all hold that a leaking pipe such as we have in this
case, is a nuisance.
.. o
2d, Nuisanc~ §132:

..

This is thoroughly discussed in 58 Am. Jur .

.

"As has been seen, a right of action for damages from
a nuisance does not arise until some injury has been
sustained, and it is generally agreed that the statute of limitations runs from the happening of the
injury, the first right of action arises when the
first injury is inflicted. Thus, where a structure,_
although permanent in its character, is not necessanl'i

1

1

I
I
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I

and of itself a permanent and continuing nuisance,
the statute beg~ns to run against the cause of action
therefor only from the time of its accrual that is
from the time when the actual damage is oc~asioned.'
The nature of a nuisance as permanent or temporary,

~hie~ a~ has been seen is a question that frequently

1s d~ff~cult to determine, has an important bearing
on the running of the statute of limitations. Where
a nuisance is permanent in character, and its construction and continuance necessarily result in an injury,
all damages are recoverable in only one action, and
the statute commences to run from the completion of
the structure or thing which constitutes or causes
the nuisance. The fact that the nuisance continues
does not make the cause of action a recurring one.
The running of the statute is not prevented by the fact
that the plaintiff failed to discover the permanent
character of the injury, or its cause, in time to bring
an action for damages.
On the other hand, when the injury is not complete,
so that the damages can be measured in one action at
the time of the creation of the nuisance, but
depends upon its continuance and the uncertain operation of the seasons or of the forces set in motion
by it, the statute will not begin to run until actual
damage has resulted therefrom. Each repetition of
a temporary or continuing nuisance gives rise to a
new cause of action, and recovery may be had for
damages accruing 1vithin the statutory period next
precedino the commencement of the action although
more tha~ the statutory period has elapsed since
the creation of the nuisance. Horeover, it has been
held that the statute of limitations cannot be a
complete bar in any case where the nuisance is of a
continuing character and the resulting encroachment
has progressively increased up to the time of commencing
the action. . . "
The leading case which cites most of the authorities

holding that inadequate or leaky water storm drains are a nuisance
and applying the basic la'lv as applicable as to the temporary and
permanent nuisance law, is the case of the City of Tucson v. Apache
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Motors, 245 P.2d 255, where the Supreme Court of Arizona stated
that \vhere the City of Tucson constructed a water conduit Hhich
was not adequate in 1925 and in February 1931, and that there
were successive floods and damages in 1940 and 1943, that the
law was as follows:

"**

7< if a nuisance is of such a nature
that although the thing itself may continue,
yet its injury to another may be abated by
human agency, and the owner or perpetrator of
the nuisance fails to abate it, the nuisance is a
continuing one, and one action does not exhaust
the remedies of the parties injured. If, however, the thing is of such a character that it
cannot be maintained Hithout continuing to be,
in the legal sense, a nuisance, it is permanent
in its nature, and the rights of the injured
party are exhausted by one action."

"(1-3) He believe the general rule to be that
if a nuisance falls Hithin the definition of a
permanent nuisance ordinarily the cause of action
arises immediately upon the creation of the
nuisance and all damages past, present and future
must be recovered in one cause of action and that the
measure of damages to the realty is the difference
between the market value of the premises immediately
before and its market value immediately after the
completion of the structure creating the nuisance.
This is not always the rule, hoHever, as will be
hereinafter sho\VTI. On the other hand if the nuisance
is temporary or continuing, a cause of action arises
upon the occurrence of each successive injury sustained. Huch confusion has arisen in the various
jurisdictions of the United States as to just what
constitututes a permanent nuisance as distinguished
from a temporary or continuing nuisance so as to
entitle the injured person to recover all damages
sustained in one cause of action and Hhat elements
must concur to start the statute of limitations to
running against the injured party. Perhaps it might
be more accurate to say that the confusion arises
more from an application of the facts in each case
to the rule of law defining a permanent nuisance."
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The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of Ludlow et al.
v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 137 P. 2d 347, again stated
that in these type of actions that the trial court was not in
error in holding that the statute of limitations was not applicable when they said:
"Furthermore, the trial court properly held that
the nuisance was a recurring rather than a continuing one, and therefore very properly held that
the statutes of limitations were inapplicable.
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437,
231 P. 813."
In this case what action for damages could have been brought in
1972 with two hairline cracks above the doorways if nothing more
had occurred?

What action could have been brought in 1973 which

required nothing more than caulking and as early as May, 1974,
not more than $500.00 would have taken care of the problem.

We

certainly agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona and the prior
announcements of the Utah Supreme Court that the nature of this
action is a recurring one and that a cause of action arises each
time that injury occurs.

Therefore, even admitting all of the

allegations prior to this time of the defendant, at the most it
would only be $500.00.
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POINT V
THE LEAKING STOR11 SEWER HAS NOT A "LATEi':tT DEFECT".
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act waives governmental
immunity for defects in public improvements in Utah Code Annotated,
§63-30-9.

That section also provides, however:
Immunity is not waived for latent defective
conditions.

Blacks Law Dictionary, Third Edition, defines latent defect as
follows:
"A defect in an article sold, which is known
to the seller, but not to the purchaser, and is
not discoverable bv mere observation. See Hoe v.
Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 5S2, 78 Am. Dec. 163.
A defect
which reasonably careful inspection will not reveal.
Schaff v. Ellison (Tex. Clv. App.) 255 S.W. 680, 682."
The question of latent defects and the interpretation of latent
defects has been handled in many car and truck accidents and
been interpretated in many insurance cases.

All of the cases

indicate that a latent defect is one that could not be discovered
by reasonable means, and that if discovered it is no longer latent.
In the case of Arrow Transportation Company v. A. 0. Smith Company,
a corporation, 454 P.2d 387, was an action by a trucking company
against a manufacturer of the fifth wheel for indennity for
damages when the mechanism failed.
that the trucking company had been

The evidence also indicated
fore~varned

by an engineering

firm that the loads which the trucking company intended to
subject the fifth wheel had caused fatigue factor.

The Supreme

Court of "t-Yashington said:
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'

I

___j

"(~)
Hithout question,
fa~lure was caused by a

the Smithway fifth-wheel
'fatigue fracture' of the
vertical metal inner tube. However, this standing
alone, does not establish a defect in manufacture
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
Smithway fifth-wheel departed, in any YTay, from the
original design which caused the Engineers to inform
Arrow of the inadequate safety factor in the Smithw~y to withstand their service loads.
At best, the
f~fth-wheel was inadequately designed for Arrow's
use, but the inadequacy was one about which Arrow had
been fully informed. Furthermore, a 'fatigue failure'
about which one is fully warned can hardly be classed
as a latent defect. A latent defect is one which
could not have been discovered bv inspection.
Hyde v. Bryant, 114 Ga. App. 535·, 151 S.E.2d 925 (1966)."
(emphasis added)

-

In the case of John W. Simmons Trucking Company, Inc.
and John H. Simmons, v. Lester Briscoe, Okl., 373 P.2d 49, an
Oklahoma case was where an automobile was struck in the rear by
a truck whose brakes failed and the defense of the trucking company
was that the failure was due to a latent defect.

The Supreme

Court of Oklahoma rapidly disposed of that argument by saying:
"There was nothing to show that a good mechanic
could not have discovered any of the defects
in the defendants' braking system on the truck."
In the case of Southwest Welding & Manufacturing Company v. The
United States, 413 F.2d 1167 (1969), this was a case where

the

contractor was entitled to an equitable adjustment in the contract
price for extra work in removing defects and the claim of the
United States Government was that they were not because they were
latent defects.

The circuit court of appeals then stated:

"The stipulated facts above summ~rized illustrate
conclusively that there was noth~ng latent about
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these indications. They were readily discoverable
upon any reasonable inspection prescribed by this
contract_or readily available. Moreover, they were
at ~11 t~mes.actua~ly known to both parties, and the
subject of d~scuss~on throughout the period that
these sections were being inspected, passed painted
and installed in the concrete tunnels."
'
The case of Plaza Equities Corp v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company, 372 F. Supp. 1325 (1974) was an insurance
case where Aetna set forth a policy defense in its insurance
contract that the damage was caused by a latent defect.

The court

then went on to say:
"A latent defect within the meaning of this policy
exclusion is an imperfection in the materials used
which could not ~e discovered by any known and customary test.
. . . The Court has found that here
the loss was caused by the misjudgment of the
plaintiffs in not installing adequate supporting
structures to carry the weight of the phoenix, not by
any defect in the materials used nor in their installation. In any event, Employers' has not presented any
evidence that this misjudgment could not have been
discovered through the use of normal weight distribution and stress calculations. Therefore, the court
finds that this exclusion does not apply in the
present case."
In this case there was nothing latent about a leaky
concrete pipe that was causing damage to plaintiffs' home.

The

defendant is not complaining, for example, that the cement in
the pipe was inferior, etc. and that as a result it failed, which
would be a classic example of a latent defective, but the facrs
in this case are just plainly that Salt Lake County negligently
installed the original pipe, negligently failed to grout it, and
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failed to correct it when it was brought to their attention.
There cannot be a latent defect if the problem can be discovered
by an ordinary inspection which, of course, any installer of
pipe or expert would automatically know and it is submitted that
the word "latent" means unknown and it cannot be unknown after
it has been brought to their attention.
The rationale of the John W. Simmons Trucking v.
Lester Briscoe, supra, Oklahona case, where that court disposed
of the latent defect argument by saying:
"There is nothing to show that a good mechanic
could not have discovered any of the defects
in the defendants braking system on the truck."
There is nothing to show that any good pipe mechanic in this case
would not have discovered

the defect.

This type of situation

was never intended to be covered by the legislature as an exclusion by Salt Lake County.

As the Aetna Casualty and Surety case,

supra, states:
"A latent defect within the meaning of this policy
exclusion is an imperfection in the materials used
which could not be discovered by any known and
customary test."
ARGUMENT:
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR ON THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
THEORY OF NUISANCE.
The trial court submitted the case on two theories
to the jury as follows:
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FIRST:

The case of whether the defendant was negligent

and whether the negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs,
injuries.

(R 354)

Under the theory of negligence and an examina-

tion of instructions 10, (R 354) and instruction 11, (R355) it is
very apparent that the instructions are proper as to negligence
and were properly submitted to the jury.
SECOND:

The second theory was whether the defendant

had created the nuisance and that the nuisance was the cause of
the plaintiffs' damage.
The court in Instruction 13 (R 357) defined a
nuisance as follows:
"You are instructed that a nuisance is anything
is injurious to health, or indecent, or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the
free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property."

whic~

An examination of 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §1 under definitions
and the authority cited,

the court very closely followed the

general law of Am. Jur., supra, which states a nuisance as
follows:
"A nuisance has variously been defined to be that
which unlawfully annoys or does damage to another,
anything that works an injury, harm, or prejudice to
an individual or the public, anything that works hurt,
inconvenience, or damage, anything which annoys or
disturbs one in the free use, possession, or enjoyment of his property or which renders its ordinary use
or physical occupation uncomfortable, and anything
wrongfully done or permitted which injures or annoys
another in the enjoyment of his le~al rights. There
are numerous other similar definitions in the textbooks and reports, and there are statutory definitions
in some states."
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The court then went on to say in Instruction No. 9 (R 353):
"Th e party.up?n whom the burden of proof rests
must susta1n 1t by a preponderance of the evidence.
The law does not permit you to base a verdict on
speculation or conjecture as to the cause of the
incident in question. If the evidence does not
prepond~rate in fav?r of the party making the charge
of negl1gence or nu1sance, then he has failed to
fulfill his.burden of proof and your finding
must be aga1nst that party on that issue. In other
words, if after considering all of the evidence
it should appear to you just as probable that the
defendant ~vas not negligent as that he was or that
his negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the
incident as that it was such a proximate cause or if
after consideration of all of the evidence it should
appear to you just as probable that the defendant
did not create or maintain a nuisance as that it did
or that the nuisance, if any, was not a proximate
cause of the incident as that it was such a proximate
cause, then a case has not been established against him
by a preponderance of the evidence as the law requires
and he cannot be held liable."
The court then went on pursuant to Instruction No. 14, (R 358)
as follows:
"A nuisance is a condition, not an act or failure to
act on the part of the person responsible for the
condition. If the wrongful condition exists, and the
person charges therewith is responsible for its existence, he is liable for the resulting damages to others
although he may have used the highest possible degree
of care to prevent or minimize the deleterious effects.
Recovery in an action for a nuisance cannot be defeated by showing that there was no negligence on the
part of the defendant.
"A Nuisance does not rest on the degree of care used,
for that presents a question of negligence, but on the
degree of danger existing even with t~e best.of care,
the question of care or want of ~are.1s not :nvolve~.
Thus, a person who creates or ma1nta1ns a nu:sance 1s
liable for the resulting injury to others, w1thout
regard to the degree of care or skill.exercised by him
to avoid the injury, and notwithstand1ng tha~ he
exercises reasonable or ordinary care and sk1ll, or
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even the highest possible degree of care.
"A nuisance may or may not be based in the negligent
act of the one creating it. However, it frequently
is the consequence of negligence, or the same acts
or omissions which constitute negligence which may
give rise to a nuisance. A lawful action may
become a nuisance by reason of its negligence performance."
Therefore, in order to hold the defendant liable under the theory
of negligence, first of all the jury had to find that a nuisance
had been created by the preponderance of the evidence, and that
the elements that were in the definition had not been complied with
and that the maintenance of that nuisance might or might not be
a result of negligence, but that the condition was a proximate
cause of damage to the plaintiffs' property.

58 Am. Jur. 2d,

Nuisances, §3, provides as follows:
"'Negligence' and 'nuisance' are not synonymous terms.
They are distinct torts, and are different in their
nature and consequences. As subsequently is observed,
negligence is not a necessary ingredient of a nuisance.
To render a person liable on the theory of either
nuisance or negligence there must be some breach of
duty on his part, but liability for negligence is
based on a want of proper care, while ordinarily, a
person who creates or maintains a nuisance is liable
for the resulting injury to others regardless of the
degree of care or skill exercised to avoid the injury.
The creation or maintenance of a nuisance is a violation of an absolute duty, the doing of an act which
is wrongful in itself, whereas negligence is a violatioo
of a relative duty, the failure to use the degree of
care required under particular circumstances in connection \vith an act or omission which is not of itself
wrongful. Nuisance is a condition and not an act or
failure to act, so that if a wrongful condition exists,
the person responsible for its existence is liable
for resulting damage to others. It has been held that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-24-

where the damage is the necessary consequence of
what the defendant is doing, or is incident to the
business itself or the manner in which it is conducted,
the law of negligence has no application, and the law
of nuisance applies. However, these torts may be,
and frequently are, coexisting and practically
inseparable, as where acts or omissions constituting
negligence also give rise to a nuisance, and it is
difficult at times to distinguish between actions of
nuisance and those bottomed on negligence . . . . "
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in the case of
Kinnischtzke v. Glenn Ullin, 79 liD 495, 57 NW2d 588, said:
"Negligence may or may not result in the creation
of a nuisance, and, on the other hand, a nuisance
may be created wholly without negligence."
In this case, the defendant, since 1972, when it attempted to
repair the leaking pipeline knew of its condition and allowed
that condition to exist from that time even to the present.

It

is submitted that a leaky storm sewer which seeps water and undermines the foundation of the plaintiffs' home continually is a
nuisance and a wrongful act within itself; and to continue to
maintain that wrongful act makes Salt Lake County liable for the
damages and consequences of the condition which it allowed to
exist.

This would be the same as a chemical plant knowing that

it was emitting acid from its smoke stacks onto the cars of the
general public and then not be responsible for its actions.

The

restatement of torts as cited by the defendant seems to indicate
that it turns on whether it is intentional or unreasonable.

How

can it be said that under that definition that a matter of law
in this case Salt Lake County's conduct was not that of being
intentional and unreasonable.
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CONCLUSION
Don Glaittli, (R 54) stated that within three years
after the installation of the storm drain in 1958 that the same
problem was being created a block to the west on his property and
Salt Lake County was there correcting the same problem relative
to the failure to seal the joints.

Then with all of that knowledge

in 1972 and thereafter, Salt Lake County continued to make representations, mislead and waylay the plaintiffs who were attempting
only to find what was causing the problem that was undermining
their garage foundation.

Now Salt Lake County seeks to plead

and claim the benefit of a Statute of Limitations and apply the
regardless of their actions, conduct or responsibility.

s~e

It is

submitted that to fail to uphold the verdict of the jury, and
the judgment of the District Court and the trial judge who reviewed
the entire matter, would be to apply a non-responsible standard
to public servants and uphold their conduct, and apply a Statute
of Limitations if the period of time runs out before a person can
file an action and discover the implications of their actions.
It is also submitted that Salt Lake County, by its
actions, has been guilty of fraud, concealment and also should be
estopped to claim the Statute of Limitations under the doctrine of
Rice v. Granite School District, supra.

It is also apparent that

they have maintained a nuisance in allowing water to infiltrate fro:
their concrete storm drain to flow under the foundation of the
plaintiffs' garage and undermine the same.

It is also submitted
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that the nature of the action is temporary and a continuing nuisance
which can be abated by proper construction which should have been
installed in the first instance or corrected at a later date or
even now.

The general law as set forth in the arguments that since

the nuisance is one of a temporary and continuing nature, that each
cause of action arose each time the damage occurred and each
spring and summer when the flood waters came down the storm drain.
Although it is submitted that all of the other arguments apply,
even perchance if they should not, the most the defendants would
be entitled to is to $500.00 reduction in reference to the total
amount of the judgment.
The attached letter, written by David Lovell, certainly
sets forth the culpable responsibility of Salt Lake County and it
is submitted that they should respond to the damages which the
jury has found in the case.
Respectfully submitted this

~~day

of January, 1978.

CANNON & DUFFIN

Attorney for Plai~tiffs
and Respondents
Ten Broadway Building, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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StJi~ S:r-:t::

FIELD QCF!CE
Blda. 3, 2033 S~ulh S<e:o s1,,:

OFFICE OF SURVEYOR

September 10, 1974

PLAIUTI<F'S

. EXI-!IiliT

3

Mr. Basil McGlochlin, Dtrector

Departwent of High\-i3Y and Flood Control
Hidvale, Utah
Dear Mr. McGlochlin:
In response to your request concerning the foundation settlement of the
residence o·:med by tk. Harlo•-1 Vincent at 4220 Coral Street, He have
made an on site investigation and it is our opinion that the settle"'ent
is a direct result of the leaking storm drain adjacent to the footings.
If we can provide additional assistance on the project, please contact us .

.:I

Very truly yours,

lJ "'__t

;?.

'l,{J/~ yi] ;c /

DALE R. HOLT
County Surveyor
DRH/DRL/js

'-

\
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing brief to Scott Daniels, Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
att~rneys

for Defendant, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt

Lake City, Utah

84101, postage prepaid, this

day of

January, 1978.
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